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Abstract 
The goal of our paper is to analyze the full return characteristics of option strangles and to develop 
a set of models to help investors avoid getting steam-rolled. Our results show that selling SPY 
strangles are generally profitable across all time frames and widths even during the critical crisis 
year of 2008. Our model posted the largest average returns of 18.28% in 2009 followed by 16.85% 
in 2011. However, the payoff profile of a short option strangle exposes the contract seller to a 
potential for unlimited losses. Our evidence on maximum drawdowns indicates that losses on some 
positions can be the equivalent of the profits gained on approximately forty prior positions. This 
payoff profile has given rise to the metaphor of selling option contracts as the equivalent of 
"picking up nickels in front of a steam roller." We use information that is available at the time a 
position is under consideration to predict the profitability of strangles and to avoid strangle 
positions with potentially large losses. 
_______________________________________ 
* Graziadio Business School, Pepperdine University
† Department of Economic Sciences, Claremont Graduate University 
Introduction 
The finance literature on derivatives is full of studies on the pricing of options, estimating volatility 
and developing models to forecast crises and market crashes. However, to our knowledge, there 
has been much less attention on the merits of specific option strategies, in particular those of 
shorting option straddles and strangles. We aim to provide some new insights by examining the 
merits of shorting option strangles on the popular SPDR S&P 500 Exchange Traded Fund (SPY) 
over the period of 2005 to 2018. SPY is the most liquid exchange traded fund in the United States 
with an average daily volume of about 500,000 contracts (“‘CBOE: Individual Index and ETF 
Volume Reports’” 2017). 
The price of an option is dependent on the breadth of possible scenarios that may occur over the 
life of an option. Canonical models, such as that of Merton (1973) highlight the relative importance 
of volatility in determining the price of an option. As individuals’ perceptions of volatility change 
over time, the price of options can vary dramatically. In a market of risk-averse investors, 
participants may be willing to overpay for insurance (Ederington and Guan (2002), Dichtl and 
Drobetz (2011)). Therefore, one could argue that options, which act as insurance, may be 
consistently overpriced and if they are overpriced, strategies of shorting options irrespective of 
market trend may be profitable. Furthermore, options have expirations and become worthless if 
they expire out-of-the-money. As a result, their time values decline exponentially as they approach 
expirations (theta decay). The combination of these factors motivates us to analyze the non-
directional approach of shorting options at various strike prices and expirations. More precisely, 
we analyze the strategy of shorting strangles, that is the simultaneous sale of out-of-the-money 
calls and out-of-the-money put options on the same underlying asset and the same expiration date. 
In our studies, we aim to provide empirical evidence of the profitability of these options strategies 
and to establish a classification of optimal trades from a risk-return perspective. 
Although there is extensive literature on derivatives, pricing of options, estimating volatility and 
related phenomena, to our knowledge, only few researchers focused on examining the rationale as 
well as the benefits and nature of returns on specific option strategies, in particular those of 
shorting option strangles. Similar statements have been expressed by Coval and Shumway (2001), 
Bollen and Whaley (2004), and Chaput and Ederington (2005). 
Professional option traders tend to be net-sellers of options by taking advantage of these expensive 
option premiums. The well-documented history of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) is 
case in point. Lowenstein (2000) notes that LTCM usually took the other side of the trade of option 
buyers who wanted insurance against a market decline.  
We are motivated to examine the benefits of shorting strangles and hypothesize that options are 
richly priced in normal market conditions. Coval and Shumway (2001) examine zero-beta, i.e. 
delta-neutral straddle positions and find that at-the-money long straddle positions produce average 
losses of approximately three percent per week. By implication, they suggest that shorting delta-
neutral straddle positions have positive weekly returns. Bondarenko (2014) argues that specifically 
one-month S&P 500 put options were “grossly overpriced.” Bollen and Whaley (2004) concur that 
abnormal simulated trading profits arise from shorting options, however, they propose that the 
implied volatility from traded option prices is greater than realized volatility because of a 
“volatility markup” that compensates market makers in options for the cost of operations. 
Although they concede that option premiums are “considerably higher” than prices derived from 
the Black-Scholes formula and realized market volatility, they argue that this overpricing does not 
present profitable arbitrage opportunities net of cost and associated risk. 
While we do not consider arbitrage opportunities for a market maker, we would argue that the 
considerable over-pricing of options constitutes an opportunity to derive returns over and above 
the risk-free rate. Simon (2007) reports that shorting QQQ straddles & strangles without additional 
conditions is significantly profitable when time horizons are 10 business days even after factoring 
in transactions costs. Kownatzki (2016) shows that the VIX, as a proxy for implied volatility, 
systematically overestimates actual volatility in non-crisis periods and that option traders tend to 
be net-sellers of these overpriced options for the same reasons stated above. 
Our results suggest, selling SPY strangles are generally profitable across a variety of widths. 
However, the payoff profile of a short option strangle exposes the contract seller to a potential for 
unlimited losses. Our evidence on maximum drawdowns indicates that losses on some positions 
can be the equivalent of the profits gained on approximately forty prior positions. This payoff 
profile has given rise to the metaphor of selling option contracts as the equivalent of “picking up 
nickels in front of a steam roller.” The goal of our paper is to analyze the full return characteristics 
of option strangles and to develop a set of models to help investors avoid getting steam-rolled. We 
use information that is available at the time a position is under consideration to predict the 
profitability of strangles and to avoid strangle positions with potentially large losses. 
Methodology 
Few papers had a greater impact on finance theory than the seminal papers by Black and Scholes 
(1972) and Merton (1973). Their ground-breaking work on the pricing of European-style options 
is commonly referred to as the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model. Although the model is relying 
on perhaps some unrealistic assumptions, the intuition and mathematical beauty of their closed-
form solution may be a major reason for its widespread use until today. The model prices a 
European call and put as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑆0𝑒
−𝑞𝑇𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) (1) 
𝑃𝑢𝑡 = 𝐾𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑆0𝑁(−𝑑1)𝑒
−𝑞𝑇 (2) 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
𝐾 ) + (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑞 +
𝜎2
2 )𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇  
where, 𝑆0 is the spot price of the underlying security, 𝑞 is the continuously compounded dividend 
yield, 𝑁(⋅) represents the cumulative normal distribution, 𝐾 is the strike price of the option, 𝑟 is 
the risk-free rate, 𝜎 is the volatility of the underlying security, and 𝑇 is the time to expiration 
expressed in years.  
In the Black-Scholes-Merton framework, 𝑁(𝑑2) represents the risk-neutral probability of the 
underlying securities price at expiration (𝑆𝑇) exceeding the strike price (𝐾𝑐) (i.e. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑇 > 𝐾𝑐) ≈
𝑁(𝑑2)). 
In the case of a put option, 𝑁(−𝑑2) represents the risk-neutral probability of the underlying 
securities price at expiration (𝑆𝑇) falling below the strike price (𝐾𝑝) (i.e. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑇 < 𝐾𝑝) ≈
𝑁(−𝑑2)). 
 
A derivatives trader is more interested in the likelihood of profitability when taking on a position 
than the likelihood of the underlying security's price exceeding or falling below the strike price(s), 
because the likelihood of profitability represents the true break-even odds on the position. A 
rational individual will be indifferent between the two measures, whereas a behavioral agent that 
may distort probabilities, will prefer the measure of the likelihood of profitability (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). We extend the Black-Scholes-Merton framework to estimate the likelihood of 
profitability for a call option by including the price of the option collected, or, paid 𝑃𝑐: 
𝑑1′ =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
(𝐾 + 𝑃𝑐)
+ (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑞 +
𝜎2
2 )𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
(3) 
𝑑2′ = 𝑑1′ − 𝜎√𝑇 (4) 
 
With this slight modification, 𝑁(𝑑2′) represents the risk-neutral probability of the underlying 
securities price at expiration exceeding the strike price plus the price of the option (i.e. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑇 >
(𝐾 + 𝑃𝑐)) ≈ 𝑁(𝑑2′)), which is a measure of the likelihood of profitability for a call option 
purchaser and the likelihood of loss for a call option seller. For put options, we can estimate the 
likelihood of profits in a similar manner by including the price of the put option 𝑃𝑝: 
 
𝑑1″ =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
(𝐾 − 𝑃𝑝)
+ (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑞 +
𝜎2
2 )𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
(5) 
𝑑2″ = 𝑑1″ − 𝜎√𝑇  
 
Here 𝑁(−𝑑2″) measures of the likelihood of profitability for a put option purchaser and the 
likelihood of loss for a put option seller. Using this methodology, the likelihood of profitability of 
more complex strategies that combine call and put options, such as ashort (long) strangle position 
where one call is sold (purchased) and one put is sold (purchased) of equal distance from the 
prevailing price at time 0, can also be estimated. Using the strangle example: 
𝑑1‴ =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
(𝐾 + 𝑃𝑐 + 𝑃𝑝)
+ (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑞 +
𝜎2
2 )𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
(6) 
𝑑2‴ = 𝑑1‴ − 𝜎√𝑇  
𝑑1⁗ =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
(𝐾 − 𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑝)
+ (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑞 +
𝜎2
2 )𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
(7) 
𝑑2⁗ = 𝑑1⁗ − 𝜎√𝑇  
 
The likelihood of profitability for a short-strangle is therefore 2 − 𝑁(𝑑2‴) − 𝑁(−𝑑2⁗) and the 
likelihood of profitability for a long-strangle is 𝑁(𝑑2‴) + 𝑁(−𝑑2⁗). 
 
In our data, we define a profitable strangle as one that has a profit greater than zero. Our baseline 
specification is our simple extension to the BSM framework to determine the likelihood of strangle 
profitability. We compare the set of profitable strangles in our test set against our extensions of 
the BSM framework. A strangle is predicted as profitable if it has a likelihood of profitability that 
is greater than the average likelihood of profitability in our training sample1. 
Our regression based models take in all of the inputs of the BSM framework and seek to predict 
the likelihood of profitability. The estimated models are fitted using the training data and compared 
to the BSM model in our test set. The aim of our model estimation is two-fold: (1) capture well 
documented option market anomalies such as the volatility smile and (2) capture the features of 
options contracts that are ideal for shorting. 
                                                        
1 We use 75% of our data (training sample) for model estimation and test our model on the remaining 25% of our 
data (test sample). 
Motivation 
Professional option traders are on balance net-sellers of option contracts, often intuitively taking 
advantage of theta decay of option premiums. As time to expiration decreases, the price of a call 
(put) option decreases exponentially. This exponential decay is declared through the Greek letter.  
In the BSM framework, it is the partial derivative of the call (put) option with respect to time to 
expiration: 
Call Theta:  
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑇
= −𝑆0𝑁′(𝑑1)
𝜎𝑒−𝑞𝑡
2√𝑇
+ 𝑞𝑆0𝑁(𝑑1)𝑒
−𝑞𝑇 − 𝑟𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) (8) 
Put Theta:  
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑇
= −𝑆0𝑁′(𝑑1)
𝜎𝑒−𝑞𝑡
2√𝑇
+ 𝑞𝑆0𝑁(−𝑑1)𝑒
−𝑞𝑇 − 𝑟𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑁(−𝑑2) (9) 
 
We are motivated to explore the profitability of option trading from a similar perspective. In an 
efficient market, where financial instruments are priced under no-arbitrage conditions, a non-
directional option strategy such as a short-strangle should be able to take advantage of the theta 
decay in option premiums. Hence the colloquialism often heard on trading floors: "When you are 
shorting an option, time is your friend but when you're buying an option, time is your enemy." 
The exponential theta decay is easy to spot with a graph that shows theta values on the y-axis and 
time to expiration on the x-axis. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of theta decay as implied by the Black-Scholes model. Theta begins to exponentially decay 
around 60 days to expiration, which is depicted by a vertical line in each chart. 
Is there an optimal time frame to take advantage of theta decay? Figure 1 depicts how theta values 
drop off as time to expiration decreases. Theta values are calculated based on a set of generic Call 
and Put equity options using the BSM model with the following input parameters: 𝑆0 = 100, 𝐾 =
100, 𝜎 = 20%, and 𝑟𝑓 = 3%. 
A first visual examination of the theta behavior suggests that theta values begin a steeper descent 
around 50 days to expiration and the values continue to decline exponentially thereafter. To take 
advantage of the steeper slopes, we examine short strangles with 40-60 days to expiration. In 
practical terms, we need to balance the amount of option premium with the theta decay. Although 
an option with say 5 days to expiration has a much lower theta value, the amount of premium 
collected is also much smaller. Furthermore, as option sellers we would be exposed to much greater 
gamma risk, since gamma increases as we get closer to expiration. 
 
Data 
Our data consists of daily options prices from iVolatility.com, a leading provider of historical 
options data. Our sample period covers the period of January 2005 to November 20182. 
Throughout our analysis, we use the prevailing options bid and ask prices as of 3:45 PM EST to 
assure market accessibility. The data from iVolatility include estimates of all greeks over time 
(delta, gamma, vega, rho, theta, and implied volatility), which we rely upon across all of our 
specifications. The data were filtered by maintaining contracts that have a positive open interest, 
a mid-point price greater than zero, and an expiration date within 40 to 60 days. The filtered data 
are used to generate option strangle positions of widths ranging from 1% to 15%3. That is, for each 
day in our sample we find all options that were available for trading after our first set of filters that 
have a strike price within a given width (e.g. 1% above or below the price of the underlying as of 
3:45 pm EST). Of the available contracts on each day, we select one call and one put option that 
have the longest amount of time to expiration within a given width. All characteristics of the 
                                                        
2 A substantial amount of time in our sample is plagued by artificially low interest rates as a result of the monetary 
stimulus following the financial crises in 2008. 
3 Generally, options that have strike prices beyond +/- 15% of the underlying price, that expire in 40-60 days, have 
very little trading volume and prices near zero. 
selected call and put option are recorded as of the date of entry and as of the day of expiration (e.g. 
delta on entry and delta on final trading day). Profitability of the call and put options in our strangle 
positions are estimated by taking the difference between the bid price on entry and the ask price 
on the day of expiration. We randomly select 75% of our sample for model training and 25% of 
our sample for out-of-sample testing. Furthermore, we rebalance our training data to have an equal 
number of profitable and losing strangles to avoid an imbalanced classes problem by resampling 
our training data to include more losses and less profits4. In total, the training data contains 19,430 
positions and the test data contains 7,548 positions. All return calculations are annualized and 
made by assuming that four times the margin required to initiate the position is invested5. A more 
detailed discussion on returns, commissions and margin requirements is included in our appendix. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Our summary statistics are reported in Tables 1-5. As previously noted, the results show that 
shorting strangles across a variety of widths6 is generally profitable with mean returns ranging 
from about 8% to almost 11% on an annualized basis.  
                                                        
4 When a model is estimated on data with imbalanced classes the model becomes susceptible to always predicting 
the most frequently occurring class; classes in our test data are kept untouched to capture real-world frequencies. We 
address imbalanced classes by up-weighting losses which occur infrequently and by down-weighting profits which 
occur frequently. 
5 Four times the initial margin is assumed to assure that each position taken on in the simulations has adequate 
capital to be funded. 
6 In our data set, we express width as the percentage distance of a strike price from the underlying asset price at the 
time of entering the trade. 
 
 
           Note:  Min. and Max. Returns on any individual position  
 
However, the variability of returns on individual strangle positions, which we measure through 
maximum drawdowns, is alarmingly high. Drawdowns are measured for any given strangle 
position by tracking the differences between the bid price of the options at the time of entry and 
the prevailing asking prices until expiration. The maximum drawdown is the minimum of these 
differences. 
We examine drawdowns of calls and puts separately and find that the put positions have on average 
larger maximum drawdowns as well as significantly larger worst case maximum drawdowns 
across all widths. The average maximum drawdowns of puts are about 12 percentage points greater 
than those of calls. We also note that the majority of the worst losses occurred in 2008. 
 
       Note: Drawdown measured as 100(Min(bidentry - askt))/(4*Initial Margin) 
 
 
        Note: Drawdown measured as 100(Min(bidentry - askt))/(4*Initial Margin) 
 
As reported in Table 4, average returns were positive in each year. Interestingly, the positions 
generated a remarkably high average return of 9.87% during the crisis year 2008. The same year 
also happens to have had the largest loss on any one position of over 98%. The fact that the highest 
average return was achieved in 2009 suggests that option prices had a long memory of fear 
embedded, resulting in relatively expensive option prices which subsequently made the selling of 
options an attractive proposition. 
 
 
          
      Note:  Summary statistics aggregated across all individual positions. 
 
 
Table 5 shows a more detailed analysis of the returns by year and by width. It is equally remarkable 
to see that even during the height of the financial crisis in 2008, average returns across all widths 
were positive. More surprisingly, even the 1% strangle width position had a positive average return 
of over 9%, which seems counter-intuitive at first. On second thought, however, it shows that the 
much larger premium income must have been a significant compensating factor in balancing the 
higher risk from options expiring in-the-money. Our detailed results in Table 5 also suggest that 
there may not be a “sweet spot” in terms of identifying an optimal width for our strategy. The 
maximum average return in each year is not consistent across strangle widths. We find that 
maximum average returns were achieved at the 1% width in years 2005, 2011, 2014 and 2016 and 
at a 10% width during the years 2007, 2009, and 2010. The overall largest average return of over 
23% occurred in 2009 at a width of 10% further evidence of a long memory of fear in embedded 
option prices. 
 
   Note:  Maximum denoted by ** in each row. 
 
Results 
Across each of our estimation methods we sequentially add in explanatory variables across 8 
specifications and multiply all of our dependent variables, with the exception of premiums 
collected, by 100 (i.e. Delta of 0.4 becomes 40, allowing for easier interpretation and a cleaner 
scaling of the average partial effects). We begin by first including simple terms that characterize 
the option contracts which include implied volatility and the prevailing bid price of the call and 
put option that form a strangle. Later, we sequentially add in comparative statics, or greeks, from 
the BSM framework one at a time in order to determine the relative importance of various 
sensitivities to strangle profitability. In our final two specifications we include controls for the 
𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ and 𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ2 of each strangle. The quadratic term is included in the final specification in 
order to determine the optimal strangle width to have the highest average likelihood of 
profitability. Throughout each of our specifications, we will be reducing omitted variable bias, 
which will allow us to determine which variables have substantial influence over the likelihood of 
profitability of a strangle position. White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
reported for our linear probability model estimates in Table 6.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Call Entry IV -0.016*** -0.0003 -0.003** -0.006*** 0.001 0.005** 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Call Premium Collected -0.101*** 0.089*** -0.212*** -0.248*** -0.211*** -0.225*** -0.182*** -0.328***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Call Entry Delta -0.015*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Call Entry Gamma -0.210*** -0.205*** -0.183*** -0.203*** -0.170*** -0.174***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Call Entry Vega 0.001 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.011** -0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Call Entry Theta 0.101*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.118***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Call Entry Rho 0.013 0.006 0.046***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Put Entry IV 0.021*** 0.001 0.002** -0.0002 -0.001 -0.003* -0.011*** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Put Premium Collected -0.025*** 0.012 0.286*** 0.353*** 0.388*** 0.456*** 0.467*** 0.531***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Put Entry Delta 0.009*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.047***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Put Entry Gamma 0.285*** 0.276*** 0.265*** 0.272*** 0.252*** 0.235***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Put Entry Vega -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Put Entry Theta -0.007 0.003 0.005 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Put Entry Rho 0.063*** 0.080*** 0.077***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Width 0.027*** -0.094***
(0.004) (0.011)
I(Width^2) 0.005***
(0.000)
Constant 0.439*** 0.860*** 0.791*** 0.948*** 0.926*** 0.890*** 0.656*** 1.341***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.043) (0.071)
Observations 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636
R2 0.139 0.19 0.206 0.208 0.213 0.215 0.216 0.222
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.19 0.206 0.208 0.212 0.214 0.216 0.221
Residual Std. Error 0.464 (df = 22631) 0.450 (df = 22629) 0.446 (df = 22627) 0.445 (df = 22625) 0.444 (df = 22623) 0.443 (df = 22621) 0.443 (df = 22620) 0.441 (df = 22619)
910.940*** 885.866*** 735.486*** 594.801*** 509.743*** 441.954*** 416.154*** 402.855*** 
(df = 4; 22631) (df = 6; 22629) (df = 8; 22627) (df = 10; 22625) (df = 12; 22623) (df = 14; 22621) (df = 15; 22620) (df = 16; 22619)
Table 6: OLS: Linear Probability Model for Strangle Profit 40-60 DTE
F Statistic
Dependent variable:
I(ifelse(strangle_pl > profitability_limit, 1, 0))
 
Note:   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01;   White heteroskedastic robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
We begin by first including simple terms that characterize the option contracts which include implied volatility and the prevailing bid 
price of the call and put option that form a strangle. Later, we sequentially add in comparative statics, or greeks, from the BSM 
framework one at a time in order to determine the relative importance of various sensitivities to strangle profitability. 
In our final two specifications we include controls for the Width and Width2 of each strangle. 
Results of our logistic regressions are reported in Table 7. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Call Entry IV -0.071*** 0.0003 -0.017** -0.029*** 0.002 0.018 0.034*** 0.048***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Call Premium Collected -0.495*** 0.381*** -0.956*** -1.145*** -0.920*** -0.974*** -0.703*** -1.469***
(0.045) (0.069) (0.100) (0.105) (0.117) (0.125) (0.130) (0.146)
Call Entry Delta -0.065*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.086*** 0.066***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Call Entry Gamma -0.964*** -0.942*** -0.824*** -0.938*** -0.739*** -0.767***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.056) (0.071) (0.075) (0.076)
Call Entry Vega 0.003 0.033*** 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Call Entry Theta 0.553*** 0.811*** 0.810*** 0.644***
(0.056) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075)
Call Entry Rho 0.033 -0.024 0.169**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.068)
Put Entry IV 0.093*** 0.003 0.012* -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 -0.061*** -0.028**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Put Premium Collected -0.093*** 0.110* 1.313*** 1.651*** 1.778*** 2.095*** 2.169*** 2.533***
(0.034) (0.057) (0.095) (0.107) (0.122) (0.132) (0.132) (0.137)
Put Entry Delta 0.045*** 0.205*** 0.211*** 0.252*** 0.230*** 0.186*** 0.223***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Put Entry Gamma 1.310*** 1.259*** 1.192*** 1.256*** 1.122*** 1.044***
(0.073) (0.079) (0.080) (0.090) (0.091) (0.092)
Put Entry Vega -0.040*** -0.039*** 0.0005 0.053*** 0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Put Entry Theta -0.073* -0.025 -0.014 0.029
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Put Entry Rho 0.281*** 0.387*** 0.376***
(0.045) (0.048) (0.047)
Width 0.168*** -0.470***
(0.023) (0.054)
I(Width^2) 0.026***
(0.002)
Constant -0.261*** 1.681*** 1.378*** 2.191*** 2.088*** 1.902*** 0.505** 4.084***
(0.047) (0.084) (0.090) (0.144) (0.145) (0.147) (0.239) (0.365)
Pseduo-R2 0.107 0.146 0.159 0.16 0.165 0.166 0.168 0.173
Observations 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636
Log Likelihood -14,008.56 -13,394.52 -13,203.09 -13,176.03 -13,106.69 -13,084.05 -13,056.62 -12,969.53
Akaike Inf. Crit. 28,027.12 26,803.04 26,424.18 26,374.06 26,239.38 26,198.10 26,145.24 25,973.06
Table 7: Logistic Regression for Strangle Profit 40-60 DTE
Dependent variable:
Strangle Profit > 0
 
Note:   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Pseduo-R2 is calculated for each of our specifications by computing 1 - Model Deviance/Null Deviance. 
 
A priori, the expected sign on call premium, put premium, call implied volatility, and put implied 
volatility are all ambiguous since an increase in implied volatility corresponds to a higher option 
price. The higher option price provides the seller of the option a larger cushion against losses but 
the higher implied volatility suggests that there is an increased likelihood that a large move may 
occur in the underlying security. The estimates of our linear probability model and logistic 
regression specifications seem to confirm our priors with sign changes across our specifications.  
The average partial effects, shown in Figure 2, are derived from our fully specified logistic 
regression, in which implied volatility has a near zero effect. Interestingly, call and put premiums 
at the time of entry have large and economically significant signs that are opposite from one 
another, indicating that the larger (smaller) the put (call) premium collected the greater (lower) the 
likelihood of profitability. The increasing likelihood of profitability associated with an increase in 
put premium collected poses a challenge for our model, which will leave the model exposed to the 
potential for large drawdowns, as the higher premium is associated with increased risk. 
Delta and Gamma represent the first and second partial derivatives of the BSM framework with 
respect to the underlying price. In theory, as Delta and Gamma increase in absolute value, the 
likelihood of the underlying security going into the money increases, therefore an option seller is 
negatively impacted by a rise in Delta or Gamma. A low Delta on calls is associated with a low 
probability of the option ending in the money, while for puts a high Delta is associated with a low 
probability of the option ending in the money. Our results in both model estimation techniques 
indicate that a high put Delta is more impactful on predicting strangle profitability than a call's 
Delta, where a one percentage point increase in Delta for puts increases strangle profitability by 
2.23% and a one percentage point increase in Delta for calls increases strangle profitability by 
0.6%. 
Vega captures the sensitivity of the option price with respect to changes in the volatility of the 
underlying security. As Vega increases, options prices begin to move faster in response to changes 
in volatility. From the perspective of an option seller, the faster changes of the options prices 
correspond to an increase in the risk of the option going into the money. Faster changes of the 
options prices can be both dangerous and helpful for a strangle position leaving an ambiguous 
effect on option strangles, which is captured by the statistical insignificance of Vega on predicting 
strangle profitability in our fully specified models. 
Rho represents the sensitivity of the option price with respect to changes in the risk-free rate of 
interest. Generally, call options prices increase as the risk-free rate of interest rises and put options 
prices decrease as the risk-free rate of interest rises. Our estimated models indicate that an increase 
in Rho for puts in our strangle positions increases the likelihood of strangle profitability, in-line 
with theoretical predictions. 
Lastly, Theta represents the sensitivity of the option price with respect to time. As discussed 
previously, the likelihood of an option expiring in the money diminishes exponentially as the 
option approaches expiration. As a result, a strangle position should have an increasing likelihood 
of profitability as Theta increases in absolute terms. Our empirical results suggest that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that an increase in Theta leads to a higher likelihood of strangle profitability 
by the significant and positive coefficients on call Theta. 
 
  
Note:  Each of the examples is the mean of each variable at the given width. 
            Values for all greeks and IV were multiplied by 100 ((i.e. Delta of 0.4 becomes 40) 
 
Average partial effects of our logistic model are plotted in Figure 2. For robustness, we include in 
the appendix the marginal effects of the logistic model across a wide variety of quantiles, all of 
which yield similar results to our average partial effects estimates. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average partial effects reported from our logistic model estimate in specification 8. Call and Put premiums 
collected have the largest measured effects on estimating the likelihood of profitability of strangles. The higher option 
premiums collected provide a cushion against potential losses. 
 
Strategy Performance 
Profitability of the call and put options in the strangle positions are estimated by taking the 
difference between the bid price on entry and the ask price on the day of expiration. We calculate 
the annualized return on a given position by comparing the profit/loss on one contract to four times 
the initial margin required to take on the position. Across our out-of-sample test set of 7,548 
positions, the average annualized return for all positions is 11.08% and an average annualized 
maximum drawdown of -11.02%. Using the BSM extension to only take on strangles that have an 
above average likelihood of profitability leads to a reduction in the average return to 9.17% but 
also reduces the average annualized maximum drawdown to -9.31%. Our baseline extension of the 
BSM framework correctly predicts profitability, across all strangle widths7, approximately 67% of 
                                                        
7 In our test set that was randomly selected from our full dataset we have 604 1%, 582 2%, 579 3%, 561 4%, 552 
5%, 544 6%, 475 7%, 461 8%, 419 9%, 374 10%, 350 11%, 306 12%, 267 13%, 216 14%, and 189 15% strangles. 
the time. All of the estimated models are successful at having a lower average drawdown than the 
overall average drawdown across all positions within the test set. 
The linear probability models are indeed successful at finding strangles that have a higher 
annualized return than the average within the test set, with specification 3-8 exceeding the overall 
test set average return. The logistic regression models are able to draw a marginally better decision 
boundary between profitable and losing strangles, causing the average maximum drawdown of the 
logistic model to beat the overall test set marginally at -9.64%. The logistic model is seemingly 
able to avoid many occurrences of small losses as indicated by the superior accuracy rate of 
predicting losing strangle positions, with the best of the logistic models in specification 8, able to 
accurately predict 87% of losing strangles. 
 
 
 Note:  Out of sample results reported on 25% of data randomly selected prior to model fitment. 
  Actual|Predicted. 
  Test sample size: 7548; Test Total Return: 11.08%; Test Max Drawdown: -11.02% 
  Returns calculated by assuming four times initial margin is invested. 
 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
In our studies, we set out to empirically test the profitability of a non-directional option trading 
strategy by shorting SPY option strangles. Our results show that these strategies are generally 
profitable across all time frames and widths even during the critical crisis year of 2008. In fact, 
2009 showed by far the largest average returns of 18.28% followed by 16.85% in 2011. From a 
specific strategy perspective, the short strangle positions with a width of 10% had the largest 
average returns of over 23% in 2009. This may imply that fear of a continuation of the crisis 
persisted far longer than actual price returns of the underlying market would suggest. In other 
words, option prices were inflated due to the heightened expectation of additional market crashes, 
driving up the prices of options. Therefore, option sellers were able to capitalize on the fear-
induced long memory in option prices. Having said that, short selling strategies are invariably risky 
and our strategies are no exception. The trades post positive returns albeit with high variability and 
large average drawdowns of up to -12.16%. 
In our fully specified linear probability model with an out-of-sample test of over 7,000 positions, 
we achieve an average annualized return of over 12% albeit with an average maximum drawdown 
of -9.95% across positions. Our BSM extension that tests only strangles with an above average 
likelihood of profitability leads to a reduction in returns to about 9.2% but still generates a similar 
maximum drawdown. The BSM extension correctly predicts profitability about 67% of the time 
across all strangle widths (77% of losing strangles and 65% of winning strangles). Our fully 
specified logistic model yields the highest performance by correctly classifying 86% of losing 
strangles and 55% of winning strangles, corresponding to an average annualized return of nearly 
14%. 
In closing, our studies show that shorting strangles can be profitable. However, given the high 
variability of returns and the potentially large drawdowns, these trades require a carefully crafted 
risk management strategy to avoid being "steam-rolled." 
In future versions of this research we will re-examine the time frames to assess optimal days to 
expiration below and above our current target of 40-60 days. Furthermore, we may use more 
advanced statistical modeling techniques to predict the probability of  in conjunction with the 
probability of profit. 
References 
Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes. 1972. “The Valuation of Option Contracts and a Test of 
Market Efficiency.” The Journal of Finance 27 (2): 399. doi:10.2307/2978484. 
Bollen, Nicolas P. B., and Robert E. Whaley. 2004. “Does Net Buying Pressure Affect the Shape 
of Implied Volatility Functions?” The Journal of Finance 59 (2): 711–53. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
6261.2004.00647.x. 
Bondarenko, Oleg. 2014. “Why Are Put Options so Expensive?” Quarterly Journal of Finance 
04 (03): 1450015. doi:10.1142/S2010139214500153. 
“‘CBOE: Individual Index and Etf Volume Reports’.” 2017. 
http://www.cboe.com/data/historical-options-data/-individual-index-and-etf-volume-reports. 
Chaput, J. Scott, and Louis H. Ederington. 2005. “Volatility Trade Design.” Journal of Futures 
Markets 25 (3): 243–79. doi:10.1002/fut.20142. 
Coval, Joshua D., and Tyler Shumway. 2001. “Expected Option Returns.” The Journal of 
Finance 56 (3): 983–1009. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00352. 
Dichtl, Hubert, and Wolfgang Drobetz. 2011. “Portfolio Insurance and Prospect Theory 
Investors: Popularity and Optimal Design of Capital Protected Financial Products.” Journal of 
Banking & Finance 35 (7): 1683–97. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.012. 
Ederington, and Guan. (2002). “Why Are Those Options Smiling?” The Journal of Derivatives 
10 (2). Institutional Investor Journals Umbrella: 9–34. doi:10.3905/jod.2002.319193. 
Kownatzki, Clemens. 2016. “How Good Is the VIX as a Predictor of Market Risk.” Journal of 
Accounting and Finance 16(6) (2016): 39–60. 
Lowenstein, Roger. 2000. When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital 
Management. Paperback ed. New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks. 
Merton, Robert C. 1973. “Theory of Rational Option Pricing.” The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 4 (1): 141. doi:10.2307/3003143. 
Simon, David P. 2007. “AN Examination of Short QQQ Option Trades.” Journal of Futures 
Markets 27 (8): 739–70. doi:10.1002/fut.20265. 
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, David. 1992. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (4). Springer: 297–323. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41755005. 
White, Halbert. 1980. “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity.” Econometrica 48 (4): 817–38. 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:48:y:1980:i:4:p:817-38. 
Appendix 
A word on Commissions… 
We do not consider commissions in our studies for the following reasons: a) a number of 
researchers use a similar approach (Bakshi and Kapadia, 2003; Coval and Shumway, 2001; Bollen 
and Whaley, 2004); b) commissions costs today are about half of what they were 10 years ago 
with a trend towards next to zero commissions. Some brokerage firms today have started charging 
commissions only upon entry; c) professional option traders do not enter into positions with market 
orders but instead place a limit order typically at the average bid-ask price. Unlike other researchers 
who enter and exit positions at the midpoint of the closing bid-ask spread (Simon 2007), we enter 
our short strangle positions at the bid side and close the positions at the ask of the closing price. 
Therefore, we invariably incur a transaction cost that may be equivalent to typical commissions 
charged by brokerage firms. 
American versus European style Options 
European-style options can only be exercised at expiration whereas American-style options can be 
exercised on any business day up to and including on the expiration date. SPY options are 
American-style. 
• http://www.cboe.com/products/options-on-single-stocks-and-exchange-traded-products/options-on-exchange-
traded-products/options-on-etps-specs 
The original BSM framework applies to European-style options only. Although numerous models 
have been developed to account for a slight premium in American-style options over European 
style options, we make a simplifying assumption in our theoretical treatment of probability of 
profit by relying on the BSM model. The rationale here is two-fold: a) We are not estimating option 
prices but rather evaluate the market-driven option prices that have the premium of the possibility 
of early exercise already built-in and b) our approach is conservative because it results in a slight 
underestimation of the probability of profit since the market prices of Calls (𝑃𝑐) and Puts (𝑃𝑝) in 
our probability model should theoretically be greater than European-style options and would 
therefore lead to an underestimation of the probability of profit. 
 
 
Margin Requirements 
Margin requirement for options are based on Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Margin 
Rules. The rules are set out in the CBOE Margin Manual dated April 2000. 
• http://www.cboe.com/framed/pdfframed?content=/learncenter/pdf/margin2-
00.pdf&section=SECT_MINI_SITE&title=Cboe+Margin+Manual 
For a Short Strangle position, the margin requirement is the greater of the requirement on the short 
put or call, plus the option proceeds on the other side. The initial margin for a short call (short put) 
is 100% of the short call (short put) proceeds plus 20% of the underlying asset value minus the 
out-of-the money amount if any. For a strangle, the proceeds from both option sales may be applied 
to the initial margin requirement. We use the CBOE definition of margins for all of our simulated 
returns. More precisely, we assume that an investor holds four times the initial margin amount for 
every position taken on to satisfy any capital constraints. 
  
 Width Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1% 0.234 0.370 0.411 0.407 0.448 0.541
2% 0.102 0.274 0.326 0.325 0.382 0.526
3% 0.049 0.188 0.246 0.252 0.317 0.506
4% 0.028 0.118 0.174 0.191 0.261 0.485
5% 0.016 0.070 0.114 0.143 0.204 0.465
6% 0.011 0.045 0.082 0.113 0.163 0.443
7% 0.002 0.030 0.058 0.091 0.132 0.434
8% 0.002 0.021 0.041 0.073 0.103 0.423
9% 0.001 0.016 0.032 0.060 0.080 0.402
10% 0.000 0.013 0.027 0.050 0.066 0.377
11% 0.000 0.011 0.024 0.046 0.061 0.356
12% 0.000 0.010 0.025 0.044 0.058 0.362
13% 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.044 0.058 0.341
14% 0.000 0.010 0.027 0.043 0.057 0.313
15% 0.000 0.010 0.029 0.044 0.059 0.280
Table 10: Call Delta on Entry 40-60 DTE
 
 
Width Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
1% -0.518 -0.436 -0.412 -0.410 -0.385 -0.287
2% -0.482 -0.384 -0.350 -0.348 -0.313 -0.213
3% -0.447 -0.337 -0.296 -0.297 -0.255 -0.151
4% -0.417 -0.296 -0.249 -0.254 -0.209 -0.117
5% -0.412 -0.261 -0.208 -0.217 -0.168 -0.093
6% -0.396 -0.232 -0.181 -0.190 -0.144 -0.075
7% -0.376 -0.207 -0.159 -0.170 -0.125 -0.061
8% -0.352 -0.187 -0.141 -0.152 -0.108 -0.048
9% -0.338 -0.167 -0.123 -0.134 -0.091 -0.041
10% -0.319 -0.149 -0.109 -0.119 -0.078 -0.034
11% -0.306 -0.135 -0.096 -0.108 -0.068 -0.030
12% -0.302 -0.123 -0.088 -0.099 -0.061 -0.025
13% -0.285 -0.114 -0.081 -0.093 -0.056 -0.023
14% -0.269 -0.109 -0.079 -0.089 -0.055 -0.017
15% -0.256 -0.109 -0.078 -0.086 -0.053 -0.019
Table 11: Put Delta on Entry 40-60 DTE
 

  
 
 
  
 
